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Testing the First Amendment Validity of 
Laws Banning Sexual Orientation 
Change Efforts on Minors: 
What Level of Scrutiny Applies After 
Becerra and Does a Proportionality 
Approach Provide a Solution? 
 
Clay Calvert* 
 
Abstract 
 
This Article examines the standard of scrutiny courts should ap-
ply when testing the validity of laws banning speech-based sexual 
orientation change efforts (SOCE) against First Amendment chal-
lenges.  Justice Clarence Thomas’s 2018 opinion for a five-justice 
conservative majority of the United States Supreme Court in Na-
tional Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra casts con-
siderable doubt on whether a level of inquiry less stringent than 
strict scrutiny applies.  The article analyzes how lower courts after 
Becerra that have reviewed anti-SOCE laws disagree on the issue.  
And yet, as the Article explains, the Supreme Court refuses to clarify 
the muddle.  First, it declined in April 2019 to disturb a decision by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that adopted the rel-
atively deferential intermediate scrutiny test to uphold New Jersey’s 
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anti-SOCE law.  The Supreme Court then followed that up in May 
2019 by dodging an opportunity to review a Ninth Circuit decision 
that applied mere rational basis review in upholding California’s 
anti-SOCE statute.  Resolving the scrutiny conundrum is imperative, 
as new anti-SOCE laws are being adopted nationwide.  They, in 
turn, spawn lawsuits necessitating clear guidance from the Supreme 
Court if lower bodies are to adopt a predictable and consistent 
methodology.  The Article concludes that anti-SOCE statutes pro-
vide a propitious opportunity for embracing Justice Stephen 
Breyer’s proportionality approach rather than one of the three tra-
ditional standards of scrutiny.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In February 2019, United States District Judge Robin Rosenberg in Otto 
v. City of Boca Raton1 addressed a First Amendment2 challenge to two ordi-
nances3 banning therapists from performing sexual orientation change efforts 
(SOCE)—also called conversion or reparative therapy4—on minors.5  The 
controversial and contested practice6 attempts “to change the sexual orienta-
tion, gender identity, or gender expression of LGBT people.”7  It pivots on the 
premise that homosexuality is a malady to be cured.8 
 
 1. 353 F. Supp. 3d 1237 (S.D. Fla. 2019). 
 2. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The Free 
Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated nearly ninety-five years ago through the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local government enti-
ties and officials.  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (finding “that freedom of speech 
and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are 
among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment from impairment by the States”). 
 3. See CITY OF BOCA RATON, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 9, art. VI, § 9-106 (2019) (“It shall 
be unlawful for any provider to practice conversion therapy on any individual who is a minor regard-
less of whether the provider receives monetary compensation in exchange for such services.”); PALM 
BEACH COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-125 (2019) (“It shall be unlawful 
for any Provider to engage in conversion therapy on any minor regardless of whether the Provider 
receives monetary compensation in exchange for such services.”). 
 4. See Caitlin Ryan et al., Parent-Initiated Sexual Orientation Change Efforts with LGBT Ado-
lescents: Implications for Young Adult Mental Health and Adjustment, J. HOMOSEXUALITY 1, (Nov. 
7, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/00918369.2018.1538407 (noting that efforts to change sexual orien-
tation are “often referred to as ‘conversion’ or ‘reparative’ therapy”). 
 5. See Otto, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1241 (“At its core, this case is about whether Defendants can 
prohibit the licensed therapists from administering SOCE therapy to minors where the available med-
ical and subject matter literature concludes that the therapy is harmful to minors.”). 
 6. See Annesa Flentje et al., Experiences of Ex-Ex-Gay Individuals in Sexual Reorientation Ther-
apy: Reasons for Seeking Treatment, Perceived Helpfulness and Harmfulness of Treatment, and Post-
Treatment Identification, 61 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 1242, 1243 (2014) (“Position papers on reorientation 
therapy from major mental health organizations clearly object to its use.”). 
 7. Press Release, Williams Inst., UCLA Sch. of Law, More than 20,000 LGBT Teens in the US 
Will be Subjected to Conversion Therapy (Jan. 24, 2018), https://williamsinsti-
tute.law.ucla.edu/press/conversion-therapy-release/. 
 8. Ignatius Yordan Nugraha, The Compatibility of Sexual Orientation Change Efforts With Inter-
national Human Rights Law, 35 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 176, 179 (2017) (“SOCE are grounded on the 
belief that homosexuality is an illness or disorder that needs to be cured . . . .”).  Indeed, it has been 
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The fact that anti-SOCE laws like those enacted by Boca Raton and Palm 
Beach County, Florida—the ordinances at issue in Otto—are proliferating to-
day9 is unsurprising.  That is largely because an American Psychological As-
sociation (APA) task force concluded a decade ago that SOCE “are unlikely 
to be successful and involve some risk of harm.”10  Harms include anxiety, 
depression, and suicidal feelings.11 
Multiple studies, in turn, demonstrate “[t]he inefficacy of SOCE.”12  Con-
version therapy today is “discredited by major medical associations because 
 
observed that conversion therapy rests its alleged value in two false claims about homosexuality: (1) 
that it is a disorder; and (2) that it can be changed.  Peter R. Dubrowski, The Ferguson v. Jonah Verdict 
and a Path Towards National Cessation of Gay-to-Straight “Conversion Therapy”, 110 NW. U. L. 
REV. ONLINE 77, 80 (2015).  
 9. By December 2018, fourteen states and the District of Columbia, along with at least forty local 
governmental entities, had banned SOCE on minors.  See Press Release, Williams Inst., UCLA Sch. 
of Law, 1,000 LGBT Youth Protected from Conversion Therapy in 2018 (Dec. 27, 2018) https://wil-
liamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/press-releases/1000-lgbt-youth-protected-from-conversion-therapy-in-
2018/ (“To date, 14 states and the District of Columbia as well as 40 localities have banned health care 
professionals from using conversion therapy on youth.”).  In January 2019, after addressing similar 
measures for more than fifteen years, New York became the fifteenth state to ban SOCE on minors.  
See Michael Gold, New York Passes a Ban on ‘Conversion’ Therapy After Years-Long Efforts, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/nyregion/conversion-therapy-ban.html.  
Then, in April 2019, Massachusetts became the sixteenth state to prohibit it on minors.  See Danny 
McDonald & Matt Stout, Charlie Baker Signs Bill Banning Gay Conversion Therapy for Minors, BOS. 
GLOBE, (Apr. 8, 2019, 9:36 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/04/08/baker-signs-bill-
banning-called-gay-conversion-therapy-for-minors/JULbGj7URc3BHnAlK1OMrO/story.html; see 
also Raisa Habersham, Atlanta Mayor Urges State to Ban LGBTQ Conversion Therapy, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/atlanta-mayor-urges-state-ban-lgbtq-con-
version-therapy/EhNPuTTDymzVLnHFvjd1CJ/ (“The practice is already banned in 16 states, the 
most recent being Massachusetts and New York, and has been long criticized by professional organi-
zations, including the American Psychology Association and American Medical Association, as an 
attempt to classify homosexuality as a mental disorder.”). 
 10. Am. Psychol. Ass’n, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE 
ON APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION, at v (2009), 
https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/therapeutic-response.pdf.  
 11. See Jack Drescher, Can Sexual Orientation Be Changed?, 19 J. GAY & LESBIAN MENTAL 
HEALTH 84, 89–90 (2015) (“After ‘treatment’ fails, patients may feel worse and blame themselves, 
question their faith or their motivation.  This may lead to worsening of depression, the onset of anxiety, 
and possible feelings of suicide.”).  
 12. Jo Fjelstrom, Sexual Orientation Change Efforts and the Search for Authenticity, 60 J. 
HOMOSEXUALITY 801, 802 (2013). 
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it is not scientifically sound.”13  As New York Governor Andrew Cuomo 
bluntly asserted in January 2019, upon signing legislation that made his state 
the fifteenth to ban SOCE on minors, conversion therapy is a “fraudulent prac-
tice.”14 
What is decidedly less clear, however, than the myriad problems with 
SOCE, is the level of scrutiny to which bans on SOCE with minors are subject 
when the treatment involves only speech and the therapists performing it 
claim their First Amendment rights are violated.15  As Judge Rosenberg 
summed up the confusion when trying to determine if strict,16 intermediate,17 
 
 13. Erica Evans & Emily Hoeven, Will Utah be 16th State to Ban Conversion Therapy?, DESERET 
NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah) (Feb. 20, 2019, 2:21 PM), https://www.deseretnews.com/arti-
cle/900056650/will-utah-be-the-16th-state-to-ban-conversion-therapy-for-gay-teens.html.  For in-
stance, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (“AACAP”) issued a policy state-
ment in February 2018 finding: 
The [AACAP] finds no evidence to support the application of any “therapeutic interven-
tion” operating under the premise that a specific sexual orientation, gender identity, and/or 
gender expression is pathological.  Furthermore, based on the scientific evidence, the 
AACAP asserts that such “conversion therapies” (or other interventions imposed with the 
intent of promoting a particular sexual orientation and/or gender as a preferred outcome) 
lack scientific credibility and clinical utility.  Additionally, there is evidence that such in-
terventions are harmful.  As a result, “conversion therapies” should not be part of any be-
havioral health treatment of children and adolescents. 
Policy Statement: Conversion Therapy, AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY (Feb. 
2018), https://www.aacap.org/aacap/policy_statements/2018/Conversion_Therapy.aspx/. 
 14. Press Release, Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor, New York State, Governor Cuomo Signs Land-
mark Legislation Protecting LGBTQ Rights (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/gov-
ernor-cuomo-signs-landmark-legislation-protecting-lgbtq-rights.  
 15. See Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 353 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1242 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (“[T]he law is 
unsettled as to which of these standards should apply . . . .”). 
 16. Strict scrutiny generally “applies either when a law is content based on its face or when the 
purpose and justification for the law are content based.”  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 
2228 (2015).  Under this test, laws are permissible “only if the government proves that they are nar-
rowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”  Id. at 2226.  Narrow tailoring under this test man-
dates that a statute “be the least restrictive means” of serving the government’s allegedly compelling 
interest.  McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014).  See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 
U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (observing that a statute that restricts “the content of protected speech” will pass 
strict scrutiny only if “it is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to 
serve that interest”); see also Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 
237 (2012) (“Content-based laws receive strict scrutiny, which nearly always proves fatal.”). 
 17. Intermediate scrutiny requires the government demonstrate that a significant interest is served 
by a narrowly tailored statute that does not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to 
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or rational basis18 scrutiny provided the appropriate test in Otto, “the law is 
unsettled as to which of these standards should apply to the facts of this case”19 
and “the landscape of relevant First Amendment precedent is a morass.”20 
In ferreting out the correct standard, Judge Rosenberg noted that the two 
ordinances appeared on their face to be content-based regulations of speech,21 
thereby presumptively triggering strict scrutiny.22  But she also pointed to 
 
advance that interest.  Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (citing McCullen, 
573 U.S. at 486).  Intermediate scrutiny typically applies when a law is content-neutral.  See Turner 
Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (noting that “regulations that are unrelated to the content 
of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny”); see also Minch Minchin, A Doctrine at 
Risk: Content Neutrality in a Post-Reed Landscape, 22 COMM. L. & POL’Y 123, 127 (2017) (observing 
that the Supreme Court “applies intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral laws”).  A law is content-
neutral when it restricts “communication without regard to the message conveyed.”  Geoffrey Stone, 
Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 
U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 81 (1978).  
 18. A court will declare a law unconstitutional under rational basis review “if it is not rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental interest.”  Thomas B. Nachbar, Rational Basis “Plus”, 32 CONST. 
COMMENT. 449, 449 (2017); cf. James M. McGoldrick, Jr., The Rational Basis Test and Why It Is So 
Irrational: An Eighty-Year Retrospective, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 751, 752–54 (2018) (noting that 
rational basis “is such a permissive level of review that it is effectively not judicial review at all.  It 
permits the most irrational of legislation to become the law of the land, no matter how needless, waste-
ful, unwise, or improvident it might be”); Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s 
a Court to Do Post-McDonald?, 21 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 495 (2012) (“The lowest level 
of review is the rational basis test—a highly deferential form of scrutiny.  In order for a regulation to 
survive rational basis review, the challenger must prove that the regulation does not bear a ‘rational 
relationship’ to a ‘legitimate governmental purpose.’”). 
 19. Otto, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1242. 
 20. Id. at 1249. 
 21. On this point, Judge Rosenberg referenced the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Reed, reason-
ing that: 
Reed would seem to compel the conclusion that if the ordinances are content-based, they 
are subject to strict scrutiny.  The ordinances identify certain speech—speech aimed at 
changing minor patients’ sexual orientation—for prohibition because the speech consti-
tutes conversion therapy.  The ordinances target what Plaintiffs say to their minor patients. 
Id. at 1253. 
 22. See id. at 1270 (“The ordinances also seem to regulate on the basis of their content, which 
would compel strict scrutiny under Reed.”).  The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear: “A law that 
is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, 
content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.”  
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015).  There is, in fact, a “long-standing practice 
that a content-based law should be subjected to strict scrutiny.”  Dan V. Kozlowski & Derigan Silver, 
Measuring Reed’s Reach: Content Discrimination in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals After Reed v. 
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“several lines of cases that exempt content-based laws from automatically be-
ing considered under strict scrutiny,”23 including laws targeting truthful com-
mercial speech,24 which are subject to intermediate scrutiny.25 
Judge Rosenberg expressed her belief that “applying intermediate scru-
tiny to medical treatments that are effectuated through speech would strike the 
appropriate balance between recognizing that doctors maintain some freedom 
of speech within their offices, and acknowledging that treatments may be sub-
ject to significant regulation under the government’s police powers.”26  She 
reasoned that applying intermediate scrutiny to anti-SOCE statutes “is entirely 
consistent with the historic understandings of the First Amendment and its 
purpose.”27 
Ultimately, however, despite her personal view that intermediate scrutiny 
was appropriate,28 Judge Rosenberg concluded it was “unclear what standard 
of review should apply to this case.  It seems likely that the ordinances are 
subject to more than rational basis review, but beyond that determination, it is 
unclear whether intermediate or strict scrutiny should apply.”29  The bottom 
line for Judge Rosenberg was that the Boca Raton and Palm Beach County 
 
Town of Gilbert, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 191, 191 (2019). 
 23. Otto, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1253.  
 24. The U.S. Supreme Court generally uses a four-prong test for analyzing regulations on com-
mercial speech: 
[Courts] must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment.  For 
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity 
and not be misleading.  Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is sub-
stantial.  If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation 
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive 
than is necessary to serve that interest. 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
 25. Otto, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1253–54; see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 
(2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (describing “the intermediate scru-
tiny of Central Hudson”); Thomas A. Zelante Jr., Comment, Paper or Plastic: Speech in an Unlikely 
Place, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 931, 932 (2018) (“Commercial speech restrictions have traditionally 
been subject to intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission.”). 
 26. Otto, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1256. 
 27. Id. at 1257. 
 28. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text (describing Judge Rosenberg’s own view). 
 29. Otto, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1258. 
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ordinances prove “that a strict First Amendment rule will not always work for 
all cases.”30  In other words, anti-SOCE laws are not easily pigeonholed into 
a traditional level of scrutiny and they do not fit snugly within what Justice 
Stephen Breyer derisively calls a First Amendment “jurisprudence of la-
bels.”31  Indeed, Part IV of this Article contends that Justice Breyer’s more 
flexible proportionality approach to constitutional issues offers an alternative 
path forward in anti-SOCE law cases.32 
Not all judges who consider anti-SOCE ordinances, however, perceive 
such a morass or muddle involving scrutiny. Just two weeks prior to Judge 
Rosenberg’s ruling in Otto, U.S. Magistrate Judge Amanda Sansone in Vazzo 
v. City of Tampa33 considered a motion to dismiss a similar challenge to an 
anti-SOCE law in a different Florida city.34  In refusing to jettison the First 
Amendment claim filed by conversion therapy counselors Robert Vazzo and 
David Pickup,35 Sansone noted that the pair alleges they “only use speech 
when they provide SOCE counseling to minors.”36  She found they had suffi-
ciently pleaded that Tampa’s anti-SOCE ordinance was “a content-based law 
that fails strict-scrutiny analysis.”37  In the process, Sansone squarely rejected 
the city’s argument that intermediate scrutiny should govern because the or-
dinance regulated the speech of professionals.38  In rebuffing this contention, 
 
 30. Id. at 1254.  
 31. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 484 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 32. See infra Part IV. 
 33. No. 8:17-cv-2896-T-02AAS, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35935 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2019). 
 34. See TAMPA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 14, art. X, § 14-312 (2019) (“It shall be unlawful 
for any provider to practice conversion therapy efforts on any individual who is a minor regardless of 
whether the provider receives monetary compensation in exchange for such services.”); see also 
TAMPA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 14, art. X, § 14-311 (2019) (using the terms “conversion 
therapy” and “reparative therapy” interchangeably to mean, in key part, “any counseling, practice or 
treatment performed with the goal of changing an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity”). 
 35. See Vazzo, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35935, at *45 (denying the City of Tampa’s motion to 
dismiss the plaintiffs’ First Amendment free speech claims).  
 36. Id. at *16.  
 37. Id. at *19. 
 38. Id. at *18–19. 
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the magistrate cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 ruling in National Insti-
tute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra39 to support her conclusion.40  
Specifically, Sansone reasoned that the nation’s high Court in Becerra 
spurned the proposition “that professional speech is subject to different stand-
ards of review under the First Amendment than other speech.”41  In March 
2019, District Judge William Jung adopted Sansone’s position.42 
In brief, and in just one month, two federal jurists in the same state—
Judge Rosenberg in Otto and Magistrate Sansone in Vazzo—saw things very 
differently on precisely the same issue.43  The former believed intermediate 
scrutiny was appropriate,44 but confessed the legal landscape was unsettled as 
to whether it or strict scrutiny was required.45  The latter was emphatic that 
the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Becerra made it unmistakable that inter-
mediate scrutiny was inapplicable and that, instead, strict scrutiny governed.46 
Judge Rosenberg in Otto refused to issue an injunction that would have 
stopped enforcement of the two ordinances at issue in the case.47  Her decision 
is now under review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.48  
 
 39. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 40. Vazzo, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35935, at *18. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Vazzo v. City of Tampa, 8:17-cv-2896-T-02AAS, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34804, at *1–2 
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2019). 
 43. See supra notes 26–31, 33–42 and accompanying text (describing these conflicting views). 
 44. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 45. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 46. Vazzo, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35935, at *19 (“[Becerra] holds [that] traditional constitutional 
analyses, including strict-scrutiny analysis, applies to content-based regulations on professional 
speech.”).  Magistrate Judge Sansone added that Becerra abrogated the logic of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for Third Circuit’s ruling in King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), 
that intermediate scrutiny applied to a New Jersey anti-SOCE ordinance because it regulated the 
speech of professional therapists.  Vazzo, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35935, at *18.  Sansone explained 
that Becerra “explicitly rejected King’s holding that professional speech is subject to different stand-
ards of review under the First Amendment than other speech.”  Id.   
 47. Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 353 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1273 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (denying the plain-
tiffs’ renewed motion for a preliminary injunction). 
 48. See Jane Musgrave, Federal Judge Upholds County, Boca Conversion Therapy Bans, PALM 
BEACH POST (Feb. 15, 2019, 8:40 AM), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/20190214/federal-
judge-upholds-county-boca-conversion-therapy-bans (reporting that Matthew Staver, an attorney for 
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Rosenberg stayed the proceedings in her court until the Eleventh Circuit rules, 
noting that “threshold questions of First Amendment law . . . will inevitably 
have significant effects on the rest of this case.”49  In contrast, Magistrate San-
sone in Vazzo refused to dismiss the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims chal-
lenging Tampa’s anti-SOCE ordinance, allowing that suit to progress at the 
trial court level.50 
How did two federal courts in Florida in 2019 become so divided over 
scrutiny when evaluating anti-SOCE ordinances and what, in turn, might rem-
edy the situation?  Those are the dual questions animating this Article.  It ex-
plores how the Supreme Court’s 2018 Becerra decision, with its analysis of 
professional speech,51 thoroughly muddled the issue of scrutiny when address-
ing whether anti-SOCE ordinances violate the First Amendment speech rights 
of counselors. 
Part II reviews how courts had resolved this issue prior to Becerra.52  
Next, Part III analyzes the majority opinion in Becerra, illustrating how it 
impacts scrutiny in cases targeting anti-SOCE laws.53  Part IV then turns to 
the post-Becerra landscape of lawsuits challenging laws banning conversion 
therapy for minors.54  In particular, it argues that Justice Stephen Breyer’s 
long-preferred method of constitutional analysis—proportionality, rather than 
a more rigid and traditional variant of scrutiny—provides a fitting approach 
for reviewing such laws.  Finally, Part V concludes by calling for the Supreme 
Court to clarify the situation, given that sixteen states55 by May 2019 had 
 
Liberty Counsel that represents the conversion therapists in Otto, “said he appealed Rosenberg’s de-
cision to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals less than an hour after he read it”). 
 49. Otto v. City of Boca Raton, No. 9:18-CV-80771, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27730, at *3 (S.D. 
Fla. Feb. 19, 2019). 
 50. Vazzo, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35935, at *45 (“The City’s motion to dismiss to plaintiffs’ free-
dom-of-speech claims under the First Amendment (Count I) should be DENIED.”). 
 51. Professional speech, as Professor Claudia Haupt defines it, “reflects the shared knowledge of 
professionals belonging to a knowledge community that is communicated from professional to client 
within the confines of a professional-client relationship.”  Claudia E. Haupt, Licensing Knowledge, 72 
VAND. L. REV. 501, 552 (2019). 
 52. See infra Part II. 
 53. See infra Part III. 
 54. See infra Part IV. 
 55. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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adopted anti-SOCE statutes and future litigation is inevitable.56 
II. PRE-BECERRA CASE LAW: SOMETHING LESS THAN  
STRICT SCRUTINY CONTROLS 
In 2012, California became the first state to adopt a statute57 banning li-
censed therapists from engaging in SOCE with minors.58  California defines 
SOCE as “any practices by mental health providers that seek to change an 
individual’s sexual orientation.  This includes efforts to change behaviors or 
gender expressions, or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attractions or 
feelings toward individuals of the same sex.”59 
The law was challenged by SOCE practitioners on First Amendment 
speech grounds, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected 
that attack in a unanimous amended opinion in 2014 in Pickup v. Brown.60  
The opinion wrestled with an issue at the heart of this Article—whether First 
Amendment speech interests required the law to be analyzed under “height-
ened scrutiny.”61  In an opinion authored by Judge Susan Graber and joined 
by Judge Alex Kozinski (then-chief judge of the Ninth Circuit) and Judge 
Morgan Christen, the appellate court held they did not.62 
In resolving the scrutiny question, the Ninth Circuit considered whether 
the anti-SOCE statute regulated speech or conduct and, in the process, the 
extent to which the First Amendment protects the speech of professionals, in-
cluding mental healthcare providers.63  The former issue is critical due to a 
 
 56. See infra Part V. 
 57. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.1 (2013) (“Under no circumstances shall a mental health 
provider engage in sexual orientation change efforts with a patient under 18 years of age.”). 
 58. See Marie-Amélie George, Expressive Ends: Understanding Conversion Therapy Bans, 68 
ALA. L. REV. 793, 795 (2017). 
 59. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865(b)(1) (2019). 
 60. 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 61. Id. at 1225.  
 62. Id.  
 63. See id. at 1227 (observing that “we must . . . consider more generally the First Amendment 
rights of professionals, such as doctors and mental health providers,” and adding that, in deciding if 
California’s anti-SOCE law is “a regulation of speech or conduct, we find it helpful to view this issue 
along a continuum”). 
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rudimentary dichotomy in First Amendment jurisprudence between laws reg-
ulating speech64 and those affecting conduct.65  Laws policing only conduct 
generally are not subject to First Amendment scrutiny,66 unless the conduct 
rises to the level of symbolic expression,67 such as burning the flag of the 
United States of America in political protest.68  Although the line demarcating 
speech and conduct sometimes is unclear,69 Justice Clarence Thomas, in pen-
ning the majority opinion in Becerra—the case that, as this Article explains 
in Part II, throws a monkey wrench into the gears of the scrutiny question in 
anti-SOCE law cases—emphasized that the Court has “long drawn it.”70 
 
 64. See generally Clay Calvert, Fringes of Free Expression: Testing the Meaning of “Speech” 
Amid Shifting Cultural Mores & Changing Technologies, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 545 (2013) (an-
alyzing the meaning of the word “speech” within the First Amendment as used by courts). 
 65. See Erica Goldberg, Competing Free Speech Values in an Age of Protest, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2163, 2204 (2018), for an explanation from Professor Goldberg that: 
The divide between pure speech—no matter how objectionable—and conduct is funda-
mental to preserving First Amendment freedoms.  Unless speech imminently threatens vi-
olence or imminent lawless action, it cannot be regulated or abridged, whereas the state 
retains wide latitude to regulate conduct.  The distinction between speech and conduct, 
although difficult to discern at the margins, is not only necessary to operationalize the First 
Amendment, but it is necessary for a peaceful, “pluralistic” society. 
See generally Diahann DaSilva, Playing a “Labeling Game”: Classifying Expression as Conduct as 
a Means of Circumventing First Amendment Analysis, 56 B.C. L. REV. 767, 769–70 (2015) (observing 
“the speech versus conduct dichotomy,” and analyzing the “distinction between speech and conduct, 
the implications of that distinction, and how courts have classified various activities as speech or con-
duct”); Paul Sherman, Occupational Speech and the First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 183, 
188 (2015) (“The notion that there is a distinction between laws that regulate speech and laws that 
regulate conduct with merely an incidental effect on speech is well established.”). 
 66. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A] gen-
eral law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at expression . . . is not subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny at all.”). 
 67. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (“The First Amendment affords protection to 
symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech.”). 
 68. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989); see also Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facil-
itating Conduct, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1, 10 (2016) (noting that “[b]urning flags, wearing black armbands, 
participating in a parade, and even dancing in the nude are well-known examples” of expressive con-
duct). 
 69. See Richard Blum, Labor Picketing, the Right to Protest, and the Neoliberal First Amendment, 
42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 595, 619 (2019) (“It is often exceedingly difficult, if not impossi-
ble to distinguish between speech and conduct, since all speech involves some element of conduct.”). 
 70. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018) (“While 
drawing the line between speech and conduct can be difficult, this Court’s precedents have long drawn 
[Vol. 47: 1, 2019] Testing the First Amendment 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
14 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Golden State’s anti-SOCE law reg-
ulated “professional conduct, where the state’s power is great, even though 
such regulation may have an incidental effect on speech.”71  This determina-
tion was pivotal because it spared the statute from rigorous review, thereby 
virtually ensuring its constitutionality.  In a nifty bit of judicial jujitsu that 
removed free speech concerns from the equation, the Ninth Circuit reasoned 
that the law targeted only “treatment,”72 and treatment, in turn, constitutes 
conduct.73  It added that “the fact that speech may be used to carry out those 
therapies does not turn the regulation of conduct into a regulation of speech.”74  
Talk therapy, in other words, is conduct,75 and thus it falls on the lowest or 
weakest point of what the Ninth Circuit dubbed “a continuum” of “the First 
Amendment rights of professionals, such as doctors and mental health provid-
ers.”76 
As for the First Amendment interests, the Ninth Circuit reasoned they 
were not adversely affected because the conversion therapist plaintiffs re-
mained free to express their opinions about the merits of SOCE and to dis-
pense information about it.77  They just could not perform it, and this impact 
on speech was “merely incidental” to the regulated conduct.78  Whether Cali-
fornia’s anti-SOCE law truly had only an “incidental” effect on speech is ripe 
for debate, but the Ninth Circuit’s framing it as such certainly was strategic. 
 
it.”). 
 71. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. (observing that the law “regulates conduct.  It bans a form of treatment for minors; it 
does nothing to prevent licensed therapists from discussing the pros and cons of SOCE with their 
patients”). 
 74. Id.  
 75. See id. at 1231 (“[T]alk therapy does not receive special First Amendment protection merely 
because it is administered through speech.”). 
 76. Id. at 1227. 
 77. See id. at 1230 (“The statute does not restrain Plaintiffs from imparting information or dissem-
inating opinions; the regulated activities are therapeutic, not symbolic.”). 
 78. Id. at 1231. 
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That is because, as the U.S. Supreme Court observed in 2011 in Sorrell v. 
IMS Health Inc.,79 “the First Amendment does not prevent restrictions di-
rected at commerce or conduct from imposing incidental burdens on 
speech.”80  Indeed, much like the dichotomy addressed earlier between speech 
and conduct,81 there is a crucial division in First Amendment jurisprudence 
separating what Professor Dan Coenen recently called “laws that directly bur-
den speech from laws that burden speech only ‘incidentally.’”82  Laws falling 
into the latter category, as Professor Michael Dorf noted more than two dec-
ades ago, “trigger more deferential judicial scrutiny.”83 
In fact, the Ninth Circuit in Pickup concluded that California’s anti-SOCE 
statute was “subject to only rational basis review and must be upheld if it bears 
a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.”84  In other words, neither 
of the traditional heightened standards of scrutiny in First Amendment law—
strict or intermediate—applied.85  The speech interests of the conversion ther-
apists were treated, instead, by the Ninth Circuit on par with those of public 
high school students under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hazelwood School 
District v. Kuhlmeier86 and prisoners per the Court’s decision in Turner v. 
Safley.87 
 
 79. 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 80. Id. at 567. 
 81. See supra notes 64–70 and accompanying text. 
 82. Dan T. Coenen, Free Speech and Generally Applicable Laws: A New Doctrinal Synthesis, 103 
IOWA L. REV. 435, 437 (2018). 
 83. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1178 
(1996). 
 84. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 85. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text (addressing, respectively, strict scrutiny and 
intermediate scrutiny). 
 86. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).  In Kuhlmeier, the Court held “that educators do not offend the First 
Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”  Id. at 273.  Dean Erwin Chemerinsky equates this test to “the classic phrasing of the ra-
tional basis review.”  Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hazelwooding of the First Amendment: The Deference 
to Authority, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 291, 294 (2013). 
 87. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).  In Turner, the Court held that “when a prison regulation impinges on 
inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests.”  Id. at 89.  This was recently described as “a low rational basis standard of review” that is 
“fairly deferential to the state.”  Jennifer A. Brobst, The Metal Eye: Ethical Regulation of the State’s 
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Applying rational basis review, the Ninth Circuit had little problem find-
ing that safeguarding minors from harm was a legitimate state interest and 
that—regardless of whether SOCE actually causes harm—it was reasonably 
conceivable for California lawmakers to believe that SOCE is harmful.88  The 
appellate court furthermore concluded that lawmakers had acted rationally in 
adopting the measure because they relied partly89 on a report by a task force 
of the APA described earlier90 which found SOCE to be ineffective and harm-
ful.91  The law thus passed rational basis review.92  Later in 2014, the U.S. 
Supreme Court declined to disturb that ruling.93 
The same year that the Ninth Circuit held in Pickup that California’s anti-
SOCE law regulated conduct— not speech—and was subject to rational basis 
review, the Third Circuit reached a very different conclusion in King v. Gov-
ernor of New Jersey.94  There, the appellate court considered the constitution-
ality of New Jersey’s anti-SOCE statute.95  New Jersey was the second state 
 
Use of Surveillance Technology and Artificial Intelligence to Observe Humans in Confinement, 55 
CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 49 (2018).  Indeed, “[p]risoners seldom prevail when judges apply the Turner 
test.”  Christopher E. Smith, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Corrections Law, 32 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 477, 491 (2009). 
 88. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231. 
 89. The Ninth Circuit also noted that California lawmakers rationally relied on reports of other 
professional organizations—namely, the American School Counselor Association, the American 
Academy of Pediatrics and the National Association of Social Workers—to support their decision to 
ban SOCE on minors.  Id. at 1232. 
 90. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 91. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1232. 
 92. See id. (concluding that California’s anti-SOCE law “is rationally related to the legitimate gov-
ernment interest of protecting the well-being of minors”). 
 93. See Pickup v. Brown, 573 U.S. 945 (2014) (denying the petition for a writ of certiorari). 
 94. 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 95. N.J. REV. STAT. § 45:1-55(a) (2019) (providing, in key part, that individuals “licensed to pro-
vide professional counseling . . . shall not engage in sexual orientation change efforts with a person 
under 18 years of age.”).  The New Jersey statute defines SOCE as “the practice of seeking to change 
a person’s sexual orientation, including, but not limited to, efforts to change behaviors, gender identity, 
or gender expressions, or to reduce or eliminate sexual or romantic attractions or feelings toward a 
person of the same gender.”  N.J. STAT. § 45:1-55(b) (2019).  The New Jersey law exempts from its 
definition of SOCE counseling designed to facilitate gender transitioning, as well as “counseling that 
(1) provides acceptance, support, and understanding of a person or facilitates a person’s coping, social 
support, and identity exploration and development, including sexual orientation-neutral interventions 
to prevent or address unlawful conduct or unsafe sexual practices; and (2) does not seek to change 
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to adopt an anti-SOCE statute.96 
Initially, the Third Circuit parted ways with the Ninth Circuit by conclud-
ing that “the verbal communication that occurs during SOCE counseling is 
speech that enjoys some degree of protection under the First Amendment.”97  
In other words, the anti-SOCE law did not simply regulate conduct and only 
incidentally affect speech, as the Ninth Circuit had found when considering 
California’s similar statute.98 
Second, the Third Circuit distanced itself from the Ninth by applying a 
heightened level of inquiry rather than mere rational basis review.99  In partic-
ular, it embraced a version of intermediate scrutiny100 closely tracking the one 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission101 for analyzing laws restricting truthful and non-
misleading commercial speech.102  The Third Circuit reasoned that New Jer-
sey’s anti-SOCE law would pass First Amendment muster “if it ‘directly ad-
vances’ the government’s interest in protecting clients from ineffective and/or 
harmful professional services, and is ‘not more extensive than necessary to 
serve that interest.’”103 
 
sexual orientation.”  Id. 
 96. See Press Release, Garden State Equality, U.S. Supreme Court Declines to Hear Challenge 
Against New Jersey’s LGBTQ Conversion Therapy Ban (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.garden-
stateequality.org/scotus_rejects (“The ban was signed into law in August 2013 by former Governor 
Chris Christie, a Republican, after being approved by both houses of the state legislature with a veto-
proof supermajority.  New Jersey was the second state in the nation to pass a ban on conversion therapy 
for minors.”). 
 97. King, 767 F.3d at 224.  
 98. See supra notes 71–78 and accompanying text (addressing these aspects of the Ninth Circuit’s 
ruling in Pickup). 
 99. King, 767 F.3d at 234. 
 100. Id. 
 101. 447 U.S. 557 (1980); see supra notes 24–25 (setting forth the Central Hudson test for com-
mercial speech and noting that it commonly is referred to as an intermediate level of scrutiny). 
 102. King, 767 F.3d at 234 (“We believe that commercial and professional speech share important 
qualities and, thus, that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for prohibitions 
aimed at either category.”). 
 103. Id. at 237 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566). 
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Applying this test, the Third Circuit concluded the law was constitu-
tional.104  In particular, it found that New Jersey had: 
• an “unquestionably substantial” interest in “protecting its citizens 
from harmful professional practices” and an “even stronger” in-
terest in King because minors needed protection;105 
• “substantial”106 proof, albeit not necessarily “conclusive scientific 
evidence,”107 regarding the serious harms wrought by SOCE, as 
well as the inefficacy of SOCE, to support the idea that the statute 
directly advanced the state’s interest in protecting minors;108 and 
• adopted a measure that was “sufficiently tailored to survive inter-
mediate scrutiny”109 because the law’s challengers failed to prove 
that less speech-restrictive means of protecting minors, such as 
requiring their informed consent before undergoing SOCE, would 
actually prove effective in doing so.110 
Just as the Ninth Circuit noted that California’s statute did not stop SOCE 
counselors from dispensing information about SOCE or giving their opinions 
regarding its merits,111 the Third Circuit observed that New Jersey’s law “does 
not prevent these counselors from engaging in a public dialogue on homosex-
uality or sexual orientation change.”112  In other words, both appellate courts 
made light of the fact that the laws did not thwart SOCE counselors from pub-
licly advocating for it in a way that might someday cause a legislative body to 
 
 104. Id. at 240.  
 105. Id. at 237. 
 106. Id. at 238.  
 107. Id. at 239. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 240. 
 110. Id. (explaining that minors might consent to SOCE counseling and treatment, despite fear of 
harm, because of pressure from family members or their community). 
 111. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 112. King, 767 F.3d at 233. 
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repeal an anti-SOCE law.113  In brief, the speech-based remedy for SOCE 
counselors runs through the legislative process—to convince anti-SOCE law-
makers to change their minds about conversion therapy or to persuade the 
citizens who supported those lawmakers to vote them out of office—not a 
courtroom.114 
Why, however, wasn’t New Jersey’s anti-SOCE law subject to strict scru-
tiny,115 a more rigorous level of heightened review than intermediate scru-
tiny?116  After all, the Third Circuit in King readily acknowledged both that 
New Jersey’s anti-SOCE statute was a content-based regulation of speech117 
and that such regulations generally face strict scrutiny.118 
Here, the Third Circuit reasoned that the anti-SOCE law regulated the 
speech of professionals119 and, in turn, that such expression “warrants lesser 
protection”120 when a professional is providing “personalized services to a cli-
ent based on the professional’s expert knowledge.”121  The justification for 
such reduced protection for professional speech, the Third Circuit reasoned, 
is largely twofold: 
(1) a distinct power imbalance between professionals and their clients 
regarding information and knowledge—an imbalance putting clients 
 
 113. See generally Ian Moss, Ending Reparative Therapy in Minors: An Appropriate Legislative 
Response, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 316, 321 (2014) (clarifying that the California and New Jersey SOCE 
“bans do not criminalize forms of speech or religious belief, but merely clarif[y] what is and is not 
acceptable practice for mental health practitioners licensed by the state”). 
 114. See Moss, supra note 113, at 320 (applauding California and New Jersey’s state legislatures 
for enacting necessary legislation to protect minors). 
 115. See supra note 16 (describing strict scrutiny). 
 116. See supra note 17 (describing intermediate scrutiny). 
 117. See King, 767 F.3d at 236 (concluding that the law “discriminates on the basis of content”). 
 118. See id. (“Ordinarily, content-based regulations are highly disfavored and subjected to strict 
scrutiny.  And this is generally true even when the law in question regulates unprotected or lesser 
protected speech.” (citation omitted)). 
 119. See id. at 233 (concluding “that speech occurring as part of SOCE counseling is professional 
speech”). 
 120. Id. at 232.  
 121. Id.  
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at a disadvantage that requires them to place their trust in profession-
als;122 and 
(2) the historically close regulation of professionals by the govern-
ment.123 
Thus, just as commercial speech is given second-class status in the hier-
archy of First Amendment speech varieties and therefore is more easily regu-
lated,124 so too is professional speech.125 
In summary, while both the Ninth and Third Circuit upheld anti-SOCE 
statutes in 2014, they did so under different standards of judicial review—
rational basis in Pickup in the Ninth Circuit126 and intermediate scrutiny in 
King in the Third Circuit.127  Furthermore, the two appellate courts differed 
over whether speech was even at issue—the Ninth Circuit concluded it was 
not,128 the Third Circuit determined it was.129  Where the two courts agreed, 
however, was that strict scrutiny was inapplicable and that the speech of pro-
fessionals that occurs during the scope of a professional-client relationship 
 
 122. On this point, the Third Circuit explained that: 
Licensed professionals, through their education and training, have access to a corpus of 
specialized knowledge that their clients usually do not.  Indeed, the value of the profes-
sional’s services stems largely from her ability to apply this specialized knowledge to a 
client’s individual circumstances.  Thus, clients ordinarily have no choice but to place their 
trust in these professionals, and, by extension, in the State that licenses them. 
Id.  
 123. See id. at 229, 234 (“The authority of the States to regulate the practice of certain professions 
is deeply rooted in our nation’s jurisprudence. . . .  States have traditionally enjoyed broad authority 
to regulate professions as a means of protecting the public from harmful or ineffective professional 
services.”). 
 124. See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 830 (2001) (writ-
ing that commercial speech currently is “treated as a second-class First Amendment citizen”).  
 125.  See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227–28 (9th Cir. 2014) (reasoning that First Amend-
ment speech should be viewed as a continuum, and “[a]t the midpoint of the continuum, within the 
confines of a professional relationship, First Amendment protection of a professional’s speech is 
somewhat diminished”). 
 126. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 128. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (concluding that only conduct was at issue). 
 129. See supra note 97–98 and accompanying text. 
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may be regulated more closely than—and thus is not subject to the same First 
Amendment rules as—speech arising in other settings.130 
It was into this split-of-authority over scrutiny that the U.S. Supreme 
Court waded—albeit indirectly—in 2018 in National Institute of Family and 
Life Advocates v. Becerra.131  How that decision affects anti-SOCE law litiga-
tion is the focus of the next Part of this Article. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT EXAMINES PROFESSIONAL SPEECH: HOW 
BECERRA CASTS DOUBT ON PICKUP AND KING 
In Becerra, a five-Justice majority comprised of the Supreme Court’s 
conservative-leaning Justices132 held that two provisions133 of a California 
law134 that compelled anti-abortion crisis pregnancy centers135 to convey fac-
tual messages they disagreed with likely violated136 those centers’ unenumer-
ated First Amendment right not to speak.137  The right not to be forced to speak 
 
 130. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 232 (3d Cir. 2014) (concluding “that a licensed 
professional does not enjoy the full protection of the First Amendment when speaking as part of the 
practice of her profession”); Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1228 (“[T]he First Amendment tolerates a substantial 
amount of speech regulation within the professional-client relationship that it would not tolerate out-
side of it.”). 
 131. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 132. Justice Clarence Thomas penned the majority opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice John 
Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch.  Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2367. 
 133. Licensed crisis pregnancy centers were required to inform patients that California provides 
“immediate free or low-cost access” to abortion services to financially eligible women.  CAL. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE § 123472(a)(1) (West 2016).  Unlicensed centers had to notify patients that they were 
not licensed by California to provide medical services.  HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472(b)(1).   
 134. The provisions were part of the Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, 
and Transparency Act (“FACT”).  HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123470. 
 135. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371 (noting that the petitioners, who operate the centers, “are de-
voted to opposing” abortion). 
 136. See id. at 2378 (“We hold that petitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that 
the FACT Act violates the First Amendment.”). 
 137. See generally Abner S. Greene, “Not in My Name” Claims of Constitutional Right, 98 B.U. L. 
REV. 1475, 1486 (2018) (observing that the Supreme Court “has interpreted the First Amendment as 
offering robust protection for a right not to speak”); Diala Shamas, A Nation of Informants: Reining 
in Post-9/11 Coercion of Intelligence Informants, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1175, 1204 (2018) (“The First 
Amendment protects against compelled speech or compelled association; in other words, it protects 
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by the government is firmly entrenched in First Amendment jurisprudence.138  
As one scholar notes, “The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the right 
of free speech includes the right not to be compelled to speak.”139  In fact, the 
day after the Court ruled in Becerra, the same bloc of conservative Justices 
observed in Janus v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees140 that “measures compelling speech are at least as threatening”141 
as those restricting it. 
Of particular importance for this Article, however, is not the scope of the 
doctrine against compelled speech; rather, it is the part of the Becerra majority 
opinion, authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, that addresses professional 
speech.142  As described in Part II, both the Ninth Circuit in Pickup and the 
Third Circuit in King contended that professional speech could be regulated 
more easily than other types of expression, thereby greasing the legal skids 
for applying a test less rigorous than strict scrutiny when analyzing anti-SOCE 
statutes.143 
The issue of professional speech arose in Becerra because the Ninth Cir-
cuit had upheld the compelled-speech obligation imposed on licensed crisis 
pregnancy centers by analyzing its constitutionality under intermediate—ra-
ther than strict—scrutiny.144  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that although the 
mandate requiring licensed centers to inform women that California offered 
free and low-cost abortion services was content based,145 strict scrutiny was 
 
the right not to speak and not to associate.”); Mark A. Strasser, What’s Fair for Conscientious Objec-
tors Subject to Public Accommodations Laws, 48 N.M. L. REV. 124, 125 (2018) (noting that the Su-
preme Court takes the right not to speak “seriously and affords it constitutional protection”). 
 138. See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, A Piece of Cake or Religious Expression: Masterpiece Cakeshop 
and the First Amendment, 10 NEB. L. REV. BULL. 1 (2019). 
 139. See Duncan, supra note 138, at 5. 
 140. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 141. Id. at 2464. 
 142. See Nat’l Inst. Of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371–76 (2018). 
 143. See supra Part II. 
 144. See Nat’l. Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d 
sub nom., Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (“For the free speech claim, we conclude that the proper level of 
scrutiny to apply to the Act’s regulation of licensed clinics is intermediate scrutiny, which it sur-
vives.”). 
 145. See id. at 834 (finding that the law at issue “is a content-based regulation”). 
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inapplicable because the law regulated professional speech.146  Professional 
speech regulations in this context, the Ninth Circuit held, were subject to only 
intermediate scrutiny.147  In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court relied 
heavily on its ruling in the anti-SOCE case of Pickup.148 
In applying intermediate scrutiny to the speech-mandate imposed on li-
censed crisis pregnancy centers, the Ninth Circuit found that California had 
“a substantial interest in the health of its citizens, including ensuring that its 
citizens have access to and adequate information about constitutionally-pro-
tected medical services like abortion.”149  The court also determined the obli-
gation was narrowly tailored because the required disclosure—that California 
offered free and low-cost abortion services to eligible women150—“informs 
the reader only of the existence of publicly-funded family-planning services.  
It does not contain any more speech than necessary, nor does it encourage, 
suggest, or imply that women should use those state-funded services.”151  The 
law affecting licensed centers thus survived intermediate scrutiny, which the 
Ninth Circuit deemed applicable to professional speech.152 
Justice Clarence Thomas and the Becerra majority, however, pushed back 
forcefully against the view that professional speech constitutes a special cate-
gory of expression—one with its own set of rules—in First Amendment juris-
prudence.153  Thomas wrote that “neither California nor the Ninth Circuit has 
identified a persuasive reason for treating professional speech as a unique cat-
egory that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles.”154  Thomas 
 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id.  
 148. See id. at 838–40. 
 149. Id. at 841. 
 150. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472(a)(1) (West 2016) (requiring licensed crisis preg-
nancy centers to inform women that “California has public programs that provide immediate free or 
low-cost access to comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of 
contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women”). 
 151. Harris, 839 F.3d at 842. 
 152. See id. at 844 (“The Licensed Notice regulates professional speech, subject to intermediate 
scrutiny, which it survives.”). 
 153. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018) (“This 
Court’s precedents do not recognize such a tradition for a category called ‘professional speech.’”). 
 154. Id. at 2375. 
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opined there were only two situations when professionals receive less First 
Amendment protection than would be expected for other individuals or enti-
ties.155  Those exceptions, which Thomas stressed do not hinge “on the fact 
that professionals [are] speaking,”156 arise: (1) when professionals advertise 
their services;157 and (2) when laws targeting professionals’ conduct inci-
dentally affect their speech.158 
In support of the former exception, Thomas cited the Court’s 1985 ruling 
in the attorney-advertising case of Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
of Supreme Court of Ohio.159  For Thomas and the Becerra majority, Zauderer 
stands for the principle that laws compelling professionals to reveal uncontro-
versial facts about the terms under which they provide services to clients are 
permissible, provided the disclosure mandate is not unduly burdensome.160  
Put slightly differently, states may, under narrow circumstances, require pro-
fessionals to convey factual content in advertisements without triggering 
heightened scrutiny.161 
In support of the latter exception regarding incidental effects on speech 
caused by laws regulating professionals’ conduct,162 Thomas leaned heavily 
 
 155. Id. at 2372. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See id. (“First, our precedents have applied more deferential review to some laws that require 
professionals to disclose factual, noncontroversial information in their “commercial speech.”). 
 158. See id. (“Second, under our precedents, States may regulate professional conduct, even though 
that conduct incidentally involves speech.”). 
 159. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 160. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.  The Court in Zauderer held that a state may compel an attorney 
“in his advertising [to convey] purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under 
which his services will be available,” provided that the facts disclosed “are reasonably related to the 
State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers” and the mandate is not “unduly burdensome.”  
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
 161. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.  The Zauderer test typically is described as being similar to rational 
basis review.  See Lili Levi, A “Faustian Pact”? Native Advertising and the Future of the Press, 57 
ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 681 (2015) (observing that the test in Zauderer is “akin to rational basis review”); 
Shannon M. Roesler, Evaluating Corporate Speech About Science, 106 GEO. L.J. 447, 505 (“Many 
courts and commentators have treated the Zauderer ‘reasonable relationship’ test as a highly deferen-
tial test similar to rational basis review.”). 
 162. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373 (noting that “this Court has upheld regulations of professional 
conduct that incidentally burden speech”). 
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on the Court’s rulings in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.163 and Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.164  Casey, the majority found, sup-
ported the proposition that informed-consent requirements that require pro-
fessionals—in Casey, doctors who perform abortions—to disclose certain 
facts about a procedure are permissible because they only regulate speech 
within the context of administering treatment.165 
Of vital importance for whether something less than strict scrutiny suf-
fices when challenging anti-SOCE statutes, the Becerra majority observed 
that both the Third Circuit in King and the Ninth Circuit in Pickup “except 
professional speech from the rule that content-based regulations of speech are 
subject to strict scrutiny.”166  The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has never 
recognized such a carve-out from strict scrutiny for anything labeled profes-
sional speech, Thomas flatly asserted.167  The only situations when content-
based rules affecting professionals’ speech are subject to deferential review, 
 
 163. 564 U.S. 552 (2011).  In Sorrell, a divided Court declared unconstitutional a Vermont statute 
that prohibited: (1) pharmacies from selling data about the prescribing practices of identifiable physi-
cians to anyone who intended to use the data for marketing purposes; and (2) pharmaceutical makers 
and their sales representatives from using prescriber information in their marketing practices.  Id. at 
558–59, 580.   
 The majority held that the law imposed more than just an incidental burden on speech.  Id. at 
567.  It concluded the statute necessitated “heightened judicial scrutiny” because it imposed a burden 
based on both the content of the speech and the identity of the speaker.  Id. at 565–67.  The majority, 
however, acknowledged that “restrictions on protected expression are distinct from restrictions on 
economic activity or, more generally, on nonexpressive conduct” and “that the First Amendment does 
not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech.”  
Id. at 567.  The Vermont law, in the majority’s opinion, did not fit into those exceptions allowing for 
deferential review.  Id. at 579. 
 164. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  In Casey, among other things, the Court upheld an informed-consent 
requirement in the face of a First Amendment speech challenge by physicians who did not wish to be 
compelled to disclose certain information to women seeking abortions.  Id. at 884.  The Court con-
cluded that the physicians’ First Amendment interest in not being compelled to disclose certain risks 
about abortion arose “only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and 
regulation by the State.”  Id. 
 165. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373.  
 166. Id. at 2371. 
 167. See id. at 2371–72 (“But this Court has not recognized ‘professional speech’ as a separate 
category of speech.  Speech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered by ‘professionals.’”). 
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he reasoned, are the two described above: (1) compelled disclosures of non-
controversial facts in advertising;168 and (2) conduct regulations incidentally 
affecting speech, including factual disclosures via informed-consent man-
dates.169 
This raises a crucial question: How does Becerra’s assault on the profes-
sional-speech logic of both Pickup and King impact the level of scrutiny that 
applies when analyzing anti-SOCE statutes? 
The answer, in brief, is that Becerra leaves anti-SOCE law jurispru-
dence—particularly regarding First Amendment scrutiny—in turmoil.  The 
schism over scrutiny in 2019 between the courts in Otto v. City of Boca Ra-
ton170 and Vazzo v. City of Tampa171—recall, as well, that Magistrate Sansone 
in Vazzo cited Becerra in concluding that the plaintiffs successfully pleaded 
that strict scrutiny was the correct test for analyzing Tampa’s anti-SOCE or-
dinance172—simply begins to scratch the surface.  
For instance, some view Becerra as outright overruling Pickup and King.  
In the Ninth Circuit’s January 2019 decision in American Beverage Associa-
tion v. City and County of San Francisco,173 Judge Sandra Ikuta expressed this 
position in her concurrence.174  Others, including U.S. District Judge Paul 
Grimm in his opinion that same month in Washington Post v. McManus,175 
view Becerra as signaling that any precedents prior to the Supreme Court’s 
2015 ruling in Reed v. Town of Gilbert176 that accorded “diminished First 
 
 168. See supra notes 157, 159–61 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra notes 158, 142–44 and accompanying text. 
 170.  See supra notes 16–31, 44–45 and accompanying text.   
 171.  See supra notes 33–41, 46 and accompanying text. 
 172. Supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 173. 916 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 174. See id. at 759 (contending that Becerra “overruled our opinion in Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 
1208 (9th Cir. 2014), as well as a line of decisions in the Third and Fourth Circuits, see, e.g., King v. 
Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014); Moore-King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560 (4th 
Cir. 2013)”). 
 175. 355 F. Supp. 3d 272 (D. Md. 2019). 
 176. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).  As in Becerra, Justice Thomas authored the opinion of the Court in 
Reed.  Id. at 2224.  Thomas wrote in Reed: “Content-based laws—those that target speech based on 
its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the gov-
ernment proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”  Id. at 2226.  In 
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Amendment protection to certain categories of speech ought to be read nar-
rowly.”177 
And what about Pickup itself?  In November 2018, the Ninth Circuit—
five months after the Supreme Court ruled in Becerra—refused to recall its 
prior mandate178 upholding California’s anti-SOCE law.179  The next month, 
the Ninth Circuit refused to rehear the case en banc.180  Conversion therapist 
David Pickup and his fellow litigants, with the assistance of Liberty Coun-
sel,181 then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in March 
 
other words, content-based laws must satisfy strict scrutiny.  Id. at 2226–27.  He added that if a regu-
lation is content based on its face, then there is “no need to consider the government’s justifications 
or purposes for enacting” it, as it must face strict scrutiny.  Id. at 2227.  
 177. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 297. 
 178. See Steven D. McLamb, Federal Appellate Procedure—Recall of Mandate—Review of Judg-
ments after Rehearing and Appeal Periods Expire, 24 VILL. L. REV. 157, 159 (1978) (“The mandate 
is the command of the appellate court to the court below to execute the appellate judgment.”); see also 
FED. R. APP. P. 41 (describing the contents of mandates issued by federal appellate courts).  
 179. Pickup v. Brown, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 31414 (9th Cir. Nov. 6, 2018).  Federal appellate 
courts have inherent discretionary power to recall their mandates to lower courts “in extraordinary 
circumstances.”  Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 549–50 (1998).  The Ninth Circuit, for exam-
ple, holds: “When a decision of the Supreme Court ‘departs in some pivotal aspects’ from a decision 
of a federal appeals court, recall of a mandate may be warranted to the extent necessary ‘to protect the 
integrity’ of the court of appeals’ prior judgment.”  Zipfel v. Halliburton Co., 861 F.2d 565, 567 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (quoting Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 560 F.2d 589, 596 (3d Cir. 1977)); see also Aaron-
Andrew P. Bruhl, The Supreme Court’s Controversial GVRs—and an Alternative, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
711, 738 n.109 (2009) (asserting that “[r]ecalling the appellate court’s mandate is an extraordinary 
procedure,” and contending that “it might occasionally be used to bring a recent decision into con-
formity with new precedent, especially where the erroneous decision has a continuing prospective 
effect”); Deborah Roy, Note, The Sixth Circuit’s Unprecedented Reopening of Demjanjuk v. Petrov-
sky, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 737, 745 (1994) (noting that one of the circumstances in which an appellate 
court may recall a mandate is “when a Supreme Court decision has changed the controlling law”). 
 The power of an appellate court “to recall its mandate is not conferred by statute, but its exist-
ence cannot be questioned.”  Aerojet-General Corp. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 478 F.2d 248, 254 (9th 
Cir. 1973). 
 180. See Pickup v. Brown, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 36317 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2018). 
 181. The organization describes itself on its website as: 
[We are] a Christian ministry that proclaims, advocates, supports, advances, and defends 
the good news that God in the person of Jesus Christ paid the penalty for our sins and offers 
forgiveness and eternal life to all who accept him as Lord and Savior.  Every ministry and 
project of Liberty Counsel centers around and is based upon this good news, which is also 
referred to as the gospel.  
About Liberty Counsel, LIBERTY COUNSEL, https://lc.org/about. 
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2019.182 
The petition contended that the Supreme Court’s decision in Becerra “re-
jected the Ninth Circuit’s newly minted ‘professional’ speech category, and 
by name, abrogated Pickup, the case at bar.”183  It added that the Ninth Circuit 
abused its discretion in late 2018 by refusing to recall its earlier mandate in 
Pickup “despite this Court’s explicit abrogation of its decision and the contin-
uing irreparable injury occurring as a result of the content-based speech re-
strictions.”184  The petition emphasized that the Ninth Circuit’s prior judgment 
in Pickup regarding professional speech “was not merely questioned, but ab-
rogated by name by this Court, yet the mandate was not recalled.”185  On May 
20, 2019, however, the Supreme Court denied the petition, thus leaving intact 
the Ninth Circuit’s 2014 amended opinion in Pickup v. Brown applying only 
rational basis review to test the constitutionality of an anti-SOCE law.186 
The Supreme Court’s refusal to hear Pickup, however, was thoroughly 
unsurprising.  That is because in April 2019, the Court had denied a petition 
for a writ of certiorari to review the Third Circuit’s decision in King.187  It 
marked the third time that the nation’s high court had snubbed consideration 
of New Jersey’s anti-SOCE statute.188  In declining to review King, the Su-
preme Court left in place the Third Circuit’s decision applying intermediate 
scrutiny to the Garden State’s anti-SOCE statute.189 
Liberty Counsel, which represents the conversion therapists challenging 
the statute in King and other cases, issued a press release in April 2019 stating 
 
 182. Pickup v. Brown, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 36317 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2018), cert. denied, Pickup 
v. Newsom, 139 S. Ct. 2622 (2019). 
 183. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Pickup v. Newsom, 139 S. Ct. 2622 (2019) (No. 18-1244). 
 184. Id. at 9. 
 185. Id. at 12. 
 186. See Pickup v. Newsom, 139 S. Ct. 2622 (2019). 
 187. See King v. Murphy, 139 S. Ct. 1567 (2019). 
 188. Nancy Cutler, New Jersey Conversion Therapy Ban Stands, for Now, but LGBT Groups Expect 
More Challenges, LOHUD (Apr. 19, 2019, 4:41 PM), https://www.lohud.com/story/news/new-jer-
sey/2019/04/19/lgbt-groups-new-jersey-new-york-supreme-court-conversion-therapy-
bans/3501891002/.  
 189. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 234 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We believe that commercial 
and professional speech share important qualities and, thus, that intermediate scrutiny is the appropri-
ate standard of review for prohibitions aimed at either category.”). 
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that it “will now refile the case in light of the Supreme Court’s express rejec-
tion [in Becerra] of the lower court’s past ruling which upheld the counseling 
ban.”190  The press release also laid out the belief of the organization’s chair-
man, Matthew Staver: 
It is not a question of if, but when, the Supreme Court will take one 
of these cases and implement what it already clearly stated—that 
these laws violate the First Amendment.  The fundamental rights of 
counselors and clients to exercise their right to speak in private coun-
seling sessions must be protected.191  
Similarly, Liberty Counsel vowed in May 2019 to refile its Pickup case 
challenging California’s anti-SOCE statute.192  In a press release, the organi-
zation said it intends to “work this case back up to the U.S. Supreme Court.”193  
In that press release, Staver called California’s law “a gross intrusion into the 
fundamental rights of counselors and clients.”194 
In brief, new laws are being passed in 2019 targeting SOCE on minors195 
and, in turn, lawsuits attacking those measures will continue to be filed and 
litigated by organizations such as Liberty Counsel.  Cases such as Otto and 
Vazzo, addressed in the Introduction, bring into sharp relief the difficulties 
lower courts now face when deciding the level of scrutiny that applies for 
addressing First Amendment-based speech arguments in those disputes.196  
Should it be strict scrutiny because the laws, on their face, single out a partic-
ular topic—namely, SOCE—for regulation and therefore are content-based 
measures?197  The Supreme Court’s 2018 ruling in Becerra, with its attack on 
 
 190. NJ Counseling Case Goes Back to Lower Court, LIBERTY COUNSEL (Apr. 15, 2019), 
https://www.lc.org/newsroom/details/041519-nj-counseling-case-goes-back-to-lower-court. 
 191.  Id.  
 192. CA Counseling Case Will Return to Lower Court, LIBERTY COUNSEL (May 20, 2019), 
https://www.lc.org/newsroom/details/052019-ca-counseling-case-will-return-to-lower-court.  
 193. Id.  
 194. Id.  
 195. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra notes 1–45 and accompanying text (addressing Otto and Vazzo). 
 197. See Kozlowski & Silver, supra note 22, at 194 (“Under existing Supreme Court precedent, 
content-based laws that target fully protected expression are subjected to strict scrutiny.”). 
[Vol. 47: 1, 2019] Testing the First Amendment 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
30 
a nascent professional speech doctrine, casts serious doubt on whether any 
lesser standard should apply.198  Yet, the Court, by denying petitions in 2019 
for writs of certiorari in King199 and Pickup,200 left in place rulings by the Third 
and Ninth Circuits that, respectively, applied intermediate scrutiny201 and ra-
tional basis review.202  The next Part contends that Justice Stephen Breyer’s 
favored proportionality approach provides a path forward when analyzing 
anti-SOCE laws.203 
IV. A PROPORTIONALITY APPROACH TO ANTI-SOCE STATUTES: AN 
INSTANCE WHERE FLEXIBILITY IS PARAMOUNT 
This Article so far has demonstrated that courts are divided over scrutiny 
in anti-SOCE law cases brought by conversion therapists, with the Supreme 
Court’s June 2018 ruling in Becerra compounding the confusion.204  Some 
lower courts believe strict scrutiny applies (Magistrate Sansone in Vazzo),205 
some believe intermediate scrutiny is appropriate (the Third Circuit in King)206 
and some find rational basis review provides the correct standard (the Ninth 
Circuit in Pickup).207 
Rather than trying to shoehorn anti-SOCE statutes into a traditional ap-
proach to First Amendment scrutiny, especially given disagreements ad-
 
 198. See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text (addressing Becerra). 
 199. King v. Murphy, 139 S. Ct. 1567 (2019). 
 200. Pickup v. Newsom, 139 S. Ct. 2622 (2019). 
 201. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 234 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We believe that commercial 
and professional speech share important qualities and, thus, that intermediate scrutiny is the appropri-
ate standard of review for prohibitions aimed at either category.”). 
 202. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that California’s anti-
SOCE law “is subject to only rational basis review and must be upheld if it bears a rational relationship 
to a legitimate state interest”). 
 203. See Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court 2017 Term: Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. 
L. REV. 28, 55 (2018) (“Proportionality and balancing approaches to rights have long found favor with 
Justice Breyer.”); discussion infra Part IV. 
 204. See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text.  
 205. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text. 
 206. King, 767 F.3d at 234. 
 207. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231. 
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dressed earlier over foundational issues such as whether speech is even in-
volved,208 Justice Breyer’s proportionality tack offers a possibly promising 
solution.  Indeed, the nominee of former President Bill Clinton209 has “peri-
odically called for an alternative to strict scrutiny triggered by facially con-
tent-based regulations”210—an alternative requiring that any “interference 
with speech must be in proportion to the interests served.”211 
For Breyer, the Court’s traditional tiers of scrutiny—strict, intermediate 
and rational basis—are merely “guidelines informing [the Court’s] approach 
to the case at hand, not tests to be mechanically applied.”212  Similarly, Breyer 
believes that ferreting out whether a statute regulates speech or conduct—
something that both the Third Circuit in King and the Ninth Circuit in Pickup 
grappled with when considering anti-SOCE statutes—is often an unproduc-
tive exercise.213  It thus is not surprising, given his casting aside of traditional 
levels of scrutiny and his disdain for a pure speech-conduct dichotomy, that 
Breyer’s methodology has been described as “a sweeping departure from set-
tled First Amendment doctrine and practice.”214 
His version of proportionality, a doctrine firmly entrenched in European 
law,215 focuses on the consequences of laws and may be empirically driven to 
 
 208. As noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit concluded that SOCE constitutes conduct, not speech.  See 
supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 209. See Current Members, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biog-
raphies.aspx (“President Clinton nominated him as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, and he 
took his seat August 3, 1994.”).  
 210. Carmen Maye, Public-College Student-Athletes and Game-Time Anthem Protests: Is There a 
Need for a Constitutional-Analytical Audible?, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 55, 90 (2019). 
 211. Id. at 89. 
 212. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1673 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 213. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017) (Breyer, J., con-
curring).  Breyer contends that “because virtually all government regulation affects speech . . . it is 
often wiser not to try to distinguish between ‘speech’ and ‘conduct,’” especially when the government 
regulates “human relations.”  Id.  More recently, Breyer observed that “much, perhaps most, human 
behavior takes place through speech.”  Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 
2361, 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 214. Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment on the Tracks: Should Justice Breyer be at the 
Switch?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1280, 1283 (2005). 
 215. As one scholar encapsulates it:  
“Proportionality” is today accepted as a general principle of law by constitutional courts 
and international tribunals around the world.  “Proportionality review,” a structured form 
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determine if a sufficient justification exists for curtailing a right.216  In brief, 
the key question under a Breyer proportionality approach distills to this: 
Is the injury done by a statute to a constitutional right such as freedom 
of expression—more specifically, the negative consequences to the 
purposes and core values served by protecting speech under the First 
Amendment217—disproportionate to the beneficial outcomes brought 
by the statute in serving the government’s purported regulatory inter-
est?218 
 
of doctrine, now flows across national lines, a seemingly common methodology for evalu-
ating many constitutional and human rights claims.  The United States is often viewed as 
an outlier in this transnational embrace of proportionality in constitutional law.  
Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3096 (2015) 
(footnotes omitted);  see also Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in 
Heller: The Proportionality Approach in American Constitutional Law, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 367, 
380 (2009) (observing “the well-known European doctrine of proportionality”). 
 216. Mark S. Kende, The Unmasking of Balancing and Proportionality Review in U.S. Constitu-
tional Law, 25 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 417, 426–27 (2017). 
 217. Breyer has written that his methodology “places considerable weight upon consequences—
consequences valued in terms of basic constitutional purposes.”  Stephen Breyer, Madison Lecture: 
Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 246–47 (2002).  When it comes to the First 
Amendment, the basic constitutional purpose of that provision pivots on helping “to sustain the dem-
ocratic process both by encouraging the exchange of ideas needed to make sound electoral decisions 
and by encouraging an exchange of views among ordinary citizens necessary to their informed partic-
ipation in the electoral process.  It thereby helps to maintain a form of government open to participa-
tion.”  Id. at 253. 
 218. The roots of this question are grounded in Breyer’s observations in multiple cases.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730, 739 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that the Court 
ultimately must “determine whether the statute works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to 
its justifications,” and concluding that the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 “works disproportionate constitu-
tional harm”); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 582 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In this 
case I would ask whether Vermont’s regulatory provisions work harm to First Amendment interests 
that is disproportionate to their furtherance of legitimate regulatory objectives.”); Pleasant Grove City 
v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 484 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring) (contending that “it helps to ask 
whether a government action burdens speech disproportionately in light of the action’s tendency to 
further a legitimate government objective”); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689–90 
(2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (contending, in the context of a Second Amendment case, that “the 
Court generally asks whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is 
out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important governmental interests”); Bart-
nicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring) (opining that he “would ask whether 
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It is an approach that, as Breyer recently wrote in Reed v. Town of Gil-
bert,219 requires “greater judicial sensitivity both to the Amendment’s expres-
sive objectives and to the public’s legitimate need for regulation”220 than is 
captured by bandying about and applying terms such as strict scrutiny.221  In 
other words, one must balance the detrimental consequences, if any, to the 
objectives of the First Amendment—or, to use Breyer’s phrase from his dis-
sent in Becerra—to “the true value of protecting freedom of speech”222 against 
the benefits of regulating the speech.223 
Breyer made clear in Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge’s View224 
that “[p]roportionality involves balancing.”225  Breyer added that proportion-
ality “is specially designed for a context where important constitutional rights 
and interests conflict”226 and “is useful when a statute restricts one constitu-
tionally protected interest in order to further some other comparably important 
interest.”227  If one views safeguarding free speech and protecting minors from 
 
the statutes strike a reasonable balance between their speech-restricting and speech-enhancing conse-
quences,” and adding that this involves considering whether the restrictions on speech “are dispropor-
tionate when measured against their corresponding privacy and speech-related benefits, taking into 
account the kind, the importance, and the extent of these benefits, as well as the need for the restrictions 
in order to secure those benefits”). 
 219. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 220. Id. at 2234. 
 221. Id.  Breyer articulated his preferred methodology nearly twenty years ago: 
[W]here a law significantly implicates competing constitutionally protected interests in 
complex ways[,] the Court has closely scrutinized the statute’s impact on those inter-
ests . . . but refrained from employing a simple test that effectively presumes unconstitu-
tionality.  Rather, it has balanced interests.  And in practice that has meant asking whether 
the statute burdens any one such interest in a manner out of proportion to the statute’s 
salutary effects upon the others (perhaps, but not necessarily, because of the existence of a 
clearly superior, less restrictive alternative). 
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 222. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2383 (2018) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 223. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 402.  
 224. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW (2010). 
 225. Id. at 164. 
 226. Id. at 163–64.  
 227. Id. at 163.  
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harm as comparably important interests, then proportionality provides a vehi-
cle for analyzing anti-SOCE statutes, which restrict the speech of counselors 
in the name of shielding minors from injuries conversion therapy allegedly 
causes.228 
How, then, might a proportionality analysis of a statute banning SOCE on 
minors play out in court?  One possibility unspools as follows: initially and at 
the macro level, a judge must consider whether the harm caused by such a 
statute to the core purposes of protecting speech under the First Amendment229 
is disproportionate to the benefits of protecting minors from SOCE.230  In 
other words, are the deleterious consequences of an anti-SOCE statute to core 
First Amendment values (core values, at least, for Justice Breyer)—facilitat-
ing “the processes through which political discourse or public opinion is 
formed or expressed,”231 enabling democratic self-governance232 and “main-
taining a free marketplace of ideas”233—disproportionate to the demonstrable 
 
 228. Id. at 163–64. 
 229. See Breyer, supra note 217, at 246–47 (describing his approach as placing “considerable 
weight upon consequences—consequences valued in terms of basic constitutional purposes”) (em-
phasis added). 
 230. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 240 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that minors are more 
vulnerable to SOCE).   
 231. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring) (identifying these as “interests close to the First Amendment’s protective core”).  
 232. Justice Breyer explains this core value of protecting expression: 
The First Amendment in context forms a necessary part of a constitutional system designed 
to sustain that democratic self-government.  The Amendment helps to sustain the demo-
cratic process both by encouraging the exchange of ideas needed to make sound electoral 
decisions and by encouraging an exchange of views among ordinary citizens necessary to 
their informed participation in the electoral process.  It thereby helps to maintain a form of 
government open to participation (in Constant’s words, by “all the citizens, without excep-
tion”). 
Breyer, supra note 217, at 252–53.. 
 233. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 583 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Of particular 
importance regarding the constitutionality of anti-SOCE statutes, Justice Breyer distinguishes between 
a free marketplace of ideas and a “free marketplace for goods and services,” with the latter receiving 
“considerably less protection” under the First Amendment.  Id. (emphasis added).  To the extent that 
SOCE are performed as a service to patients, this suggests that core First Amendment values are not 
implicated by anti-SOCE statutes.  Id. at 582; see also King, 767 F.3d at 237 (explaining that the anti-
SOCE statutes do not implicate the First Amendment as heavily because of the nature of the therapist’s 
role in providing a service to clients). 
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and beneficial consequences to minors of not being subjected to the speech 
that comprises SOCE? 
On the consequences-to-speech side of this equation, a judge would need 
to consider that the First Amendment speech rights of therapists are affected 
by anti-SOCE laws only within the narrow context and confines of a therapist-
client relationship.234  For Justice Breyer, this is important because he draws 
a crucial line between protecting speech that facilitates a diverse marketplace 
of ideas (a core First Amendment value) and protecting speech that enables a 
marketplace of goods and services (not core First Amendment values).235 
The only expression restricted by anti-SOCE laws falls within the scope 
of private services rendered by conversion therapists with minor patients.236  
In other words, the lone speech banned takes the form of a service performed 
on minors that is designed to change their sexual orientation.237  It does not 
take the form of speech propounding ideas that are intended to change a mi-
nor’s political or religious views and beliefs about homosexuality.238  Addi-
tionally, no speech is restricted by anti-SOCE statutes in the public market-
place of ideas concerning whether conversion therapy is a good idea or a 
harmful practice or, in turn, whether it should be regulated by state or local 
governmental entities, or both.239  Conversion therapists and others who be-
lieve in the efficacy of SOCE are free to publicly speak their minds about this 
in any and all public fora.  
 
 234. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1228 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing the First Amendment 
implications on the rights of therapists within the scope of their professional relationship with clients). 
 235. See supra note 233.  
 236. See Clay Calvert et al., Conversion Therapy and Free Speech: A Doctrinal and Theoretical 
First Amendment Analysis, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 525, 541 (2014) (explaining that the 
California anti-SOCE law only bans “counseling designed to thwart or change a minor’s exploration 
of his or her sexual orientation”); see also Conversion Therapy Laws, LGBT MOVEMENT 
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.lgbtmap.org/img/maps/citations-conversion-
therapy.pdf (demonstrating that a number of states ban conversion therapy of minor patients). 
 237. See Calvert et al., supra note 262, at 541.  
 238. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra note 233 and accompanying text; see also King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 
237 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining that a particular New Jersey anti-SOCE statute still allows conversion 
therapists to express their viewpoints publicly). 
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This is important because it means that speech affecting the political pro-
cess regarding whether conversion therapy should be regulated by the govern-
ment—including lobbying both for and against candidates for public office 
based on their positions regarding SOCE regulation—is not impeded by anti-
SOCE statutes.  In brief, core First Amendment values appear not to be 
squelched by anti-SOCE laws.  Instead, only speech performed as a rendering 
of services in a private, one-on-one setting with the goal of changing a per-
son’s sexual orientation is detrimentally impacted. 
In a nutshell, anti-SOCE statutes regulate speech only within the confines 
of a private setting—a therapist’s office, behind closed doors.  A therapist’s 
speech in public settings—in newspaper opinion columns, during television 
interviews and at town hall meetings—about SOCE is not restrained in any 
manner by anti-SOCE statutes like those now at issue in Vazzo240 and Otto.241 
That, however, is only half of the proportionality equation (namely, the 
consequences to core First Amendment speech values wrought by anti-SOCE 
statutes).  What about the consequences to minors—the alleged benefits to 
them of restraining speech and not being subjected to SOCE?242 
A key issue here is whether a governmental entity seeking to ban SOCE 
can, in fact, demonstrate tangible benefits to minors of squelching conversion 
therapists’ speech that occurs in the setting of therapist-client relationships.243  
This may not be an easy task because, under the Supreme Court’s strict scru-
tiny test, the government must demonstrate “a direct causal link between the 
restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented”244 such that “the Govern-
ment’s chosen restriction on the speech at issue [is] ‘actually necessary’ to 
achieve its interest.”245  Deploying this direct-causal-link requirement, the 
Court holds that “ambiguous proof will not suffice.”246  Similarly, evidence of 
 
 240. See supra notes 33–42 and accompanying text.  
 241. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
 242. See King, 767 F.3d at 238 (explaining that minors could face “serious health risks” as a result 
of SOCE). 
 243. Id. at 221–22 (discussing studies cited by the New Jersey legislature that emphasize the inef-
fectiveness of, and risks associated with, SOCE). 
 244. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 725 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 245. Id.  
 246. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799–800 (2011). 
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a correlation—rather than causation—between the restricted speech and the 
harm it allegedly causes is not sufficient to surmount this hurdle.247  In brief, 
“under strict scrutiny, the government must unambiguously prove the exist-
ence of an actual problem directly caused by regulated speech.”248 
Applying such an approach for determining the impact of speech, gov-
ernmental entities regulating SOCE seemingly would need to point to empir-
ical studies demonstrating actual causation of harm to minors who undergo 
SOCE.249  Proving that SOCE may not work—that it is ineffective quackery—
may be one thing, but proving that it actually causes harm is quite another.  
There is, in other words, a difference between inefficacy and harmfulness. 
Courts thus would need to examine experimental research—not simply 
anecdotal accounts and occasional incidents—to resolve this issue.  The APA 
task force report noted earlier250 would need to be closely scrutinized.251  It 
was written in 2009, however, so the results of any and all SOCE-based ex-
periments conducted during the past decade would need to be analyzed as 
well.252 
Yet, all of the above rigor regarding direct proof of causation assumes a 
strict scrutiny approach like that recently adopted by the Supreme Court in 
both Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n253 and United States v. Alva-
rez.254  How might Justice Breyer, in contrast, consider evidence of alleged 
harms under his proportionality tack?  In fact, Breyer’s dissent in Brown pro-
vides a window on his thinking that illustrates a very different understanding 
of what it takes to demonstrate a speech-based injury sufficient to warrant 
 
 247. Id. 
 248. Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, An “Actual Problem” in First Amendment Jurispru-
dence? Examining the Immediate Impact of Brown’s Proof-of-Causation Doctrine on Free Speech 
and Its Compatibility with the Marketplace Theory, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 391, 396 (2013). 
 249. See id. (explaining that the government must provide strong evidence supporting its compel-
ling state interest under the strict scrutiny test). 
 250. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 251. See Calvert et al., supra note 236, at 532–33 (highlighting the emphasis a California District 
Court Judge placed on evaluating California’s scientific evidence of the causation of SOCE’s potential 
harm to minors). 
 252. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 253. 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
 254. 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
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regulation.255 
Brown centered on whether a California statute that restricted minors’ ac-
cess to violent video games violated the First Amendment.256  The Court, in 
an opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, applied strict scrutiny257 and 
declared the law unconstitutional.258  A fatal flaw for California, according to 
the majority, was that it failed to “show a direct causal link between violent 
video games and harm to minors.”259  Justice Scalia observed that the only 
thing California could establish with the social science studies it offered into 
evidence was a possible correlation, not causation, between violent content 
and aggression.260  Justice Scalia added that any real-world effects suggested 
by the studies were, in fact, “minuscule”261 and “indistinguishable from effects 
produced by other media.”262  In brief, the majority scoffed at the evidence of 
harm California proffered. 
Justice Breyer, however, disagreed with this interpretation of the evidence 
and wrote a dissent.263  Of particular importance, Justice Breyer gave great 
weight and deference to the view of multiple learned organizations that con-
cluded there was “a significant risk that violent video games, when compared 
with more passive media, are particularly likely to cause children harm.”264  
One of those organizations, he pointed out, was the American Psychological 
Association.265  The APA, of course, is the same entity cited earlier266 that 
released a 2009 task force report concluding that sexual orientation change 
 
 255. See Brown, 564 U.S. at 847 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 256. Id. at 788. 
 257. See id. at 799 (“Because the Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is 
invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny, i.e., it is justified by a compel-
ling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”). 
 258. See id. at 805 (“Legislation such as this, which is neither fish nor fowl, cannot survive strict 
scrutiny.”). 
 259. Id. at 799. 
 260. Id. at 800. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 800–01. 
 263. Id. at 839–57. 
 264. Id. at 853. 
 265. Id.  
 266. Supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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efforts “are unlikely to be successful and involve some risk of harm.”267  In 
brief, Justice Breyer gives credence to the views of an organization whose 
report on SOCE plays a key role in supporting laws that target it.268 
In Brown, Justice Breyer willingly deferred to the judgment of California 
lawmakers in relying on comprehensive reviews of the evidence by organiza-
tions such as the APA about the effects of violent video games on minors.269  
He emphasized that Justice Scalia and the majority failed to grant such defer-
ence.270  Deference is owed to lawmakers, Justice Breyer asserted, when the 
Justices lack expertise on “technical matters.”271  Social science is precisely 
such an area, Breyer contended.272 
Finally, Breyer’s dissent in Brown reveals his willingness to tolerate a 
certain amount of ambiguity and disagreement regarding the findings of spe-
cific social science studies.  As he put it, “[l]ike many, perhaps most, studies 
of human behavior, each study has its critics, and some of those critics have 
produced studies of their own in which they reach different conclusions.”273  
What was seemingly pivotal in Brown for Breyer was that despite such disa-
greements about individual studies, organizations like the APA that reviewed 
the entire body of evidence concluded that violent content creates a significant 
risk of harm to minors.274 
 
 267. Am. Psychol. Ass’n, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE 
ON APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION, at v (2009), 
https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/therapeutic-response.pdf. 
 268. See Brown, 564 U.S. at 855 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding weight in the APA’s research on 
the effects of video games on adolescents). 
 269. Id. (“Unlike the majority, I would find sufficient grounds in these studies and expert opinions 
for this Court to defer to an elected legislature’s conclusion that the video games in question are par-
ticularly likely to harm children.”). 
 270. Id.  
 271. Id.  
 272. See id. at 853 (“I, like most judges, lack the social science expertise to say definitively who is 
right.”). 
 273. Id.  
 274. Id. at 853–55.  As Justice Breyer put it: 
I, like most judges, lack the social science expertise to say definitively who is right.  But 
associations of public health professionals who do possess that expertise have reviewed 
many of these studies and found a significant risk that violent video games, when compared 
with more passive media, are particularly likely to cause children harm. 
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In a nutshell, Breyer’s approach to social science evidence pivots on def-
erence and, in particular, deference granted both to professional organizations 
that address health and safety issues and to lawmakers that rely on the reports 
of those organizations.275  Therefore, when lawmakers rely on reports by or-
ganizations such as the APA when adopting anti-SOCE statutes, Breyer would 
seem likely to grant them deference in their determination that conversion 
therapy harms minors.276  This, in turn, makes the odds of upholding an anti-
SOCE statute much greater than the direct-causal-link approach used by the 
Court under a strict scrutiny standard.277 
Finally, Breyer’s approach here may be useful because of the difficulty 
of conducting experimental studies involving SOCE on minors.  Specifically, 
it seems highly unlikely that a university’s institutional review board would 
approve a study on minors that might, in fact, genuinely harm them regarding 
something as core to their being as sexual orientation.278  Even Justice Scalia 
acknowledged, when considering the alleged effects of broadcast profanity on 
minors, that “[t]here are some propositions for which scant empirical evidence 
 
Id. at 853.  
 275. Clay Calvert et al., Social Science, Media Effects & the Supreme Court: Is Communication 
Research Relevant After Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association?, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 
293, 305 (2012). 
 276. See id. at 305–06 (describing how Justice Breyer would generally defer to expert opinions 
regarding topics on which Breyer is not an expert); see also Brown, 564 U.S. at 855 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting) (“I would find sufficient grounds in these studies and expert opinions for this Court to defer 
to an elected legislature’s conclusion that the video games in question are particularly likely to harm 
children.”). 
 277. See supra notes 245–49 and accompanying text (describing the requirement for the Court to 
show a direct causal link between the proffered restriction and the harm the Court wants to prevent in 
order to comply with a strict scrutiny standard in interpreting anti-SOCE statutes); Brown, 564 U.S. at 
853–54 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (giving credence to the American Psychological Association about 
video games harming children).  Since Breyer relies on the APA’s views in Brown, it is likely that he 
would also rely on the APA’s views regarding sexual orientation change efforts being harmful and 
ineffective for children, thereby increasing the odds of upholding anti-SOCE statutes.  See id. at 855.   
 278. See Ralph L. Rosnow et al., The Institutional Review Board as a Mirror of Scientific and Eth-
ical Standards, 48 AM. PSYCHOL. 821, 822 (1993) (it is “[a] central responsibility of IRBs . . . to ensure 
that the potential benefits to the individual research participants (and to society) will be greater than 
any risks that may be encountered by participation in the research” (citation omitted)).   
[Vol. 47: 1, 2019] Testing the First Amendment 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
41 
can be marshaled.”279  He explained there that “[o]ne cannot demand a multi-
year controlled study, in which some children are intentionally exposed to in-
decent broadcasts (and insulated from all other indecency), and others are 
shielded from all indecency.”280  The same could easily be said about conduct-
ing such a study of SOCE where the alleged harm is not merely the expansion 
of a child’s vocabulary to include expletives and naughty language, but much 
more serious ailments, such as anxiety, depression, and suicidal feelings.281 
Where, then, does this leave a judge if a proportionality analysis to an 
anti-SOCE statute were to unfold as laid about above?  If, as articulated ear-
lier, a judge finds: (1) that core First Amendment interests in protecting 
speech—for Breyer, this means promoting a diverse marketplace of ideas (ra-
ther than one for services) and facilitating democratic self-governance282—are 
not implicated by regulating speech regarding SOCE that occurs only in the 
context of a private, one-on-one, therapist-client relationship; and (2) that the 
views of organizations, such as the APA,  about the negative consequences of 
SOCE on minors are to be given substantial weight and deference, then the 
next step is for a judge to decide if the harm to First Amendment interests is 
disproportionate to the positive consequences for minors of being shielded by 
statute from SOCE.  This, in other words, is the comparison of the conse-
quences on both sides of the equation to determine if the good brought by the 
statute to LGBTQ children outweighs the harm worked to First Amendment 
interests.283  That decision, of course, would be left to a judge, not the musings 
of a professor in a law journal article.284 
The hypothetical analysis set forth immediately above under a possible 
proportionality approach to scrutiny is merely one conceivable scenario, but 
 
 279. FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 519 (2009). 
 280. Id. 
 281. Supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra notes 231–33 and accompanying text (addressing what Breyer perceives as core 
reasons why the First Amendment protects speech). 
 283. See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570, 693 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The ultimate question is whether the statute imposes 
burdens that, when viewed in light of the statute’s legitimate objectives, are disproportionate.”). 
 284. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730 (2012) (stating that the Court is the one to 
“determine whether the statute works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to its justifica-
tions”). 
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it is not the only one.  What is more, it hinges partly on the core values of 
protecting speech under the First Amendment as Justice Breyer seemingly 
perceives them.285  Other justices, however, might focus on different values, 
such as protecting the right of conversion therapists to realize their own iden-
tities through speech as therapists who attempt to change the sexual orienta-
tion of gay and lesbian minors.286  Adopting such a view seemingly would 
change the analysis, suggesting a greater harm to First Amendment speech 
interests when balanced against the positive consequences of shielding minors 
from SOCE.287  Regardless, this Article has gone beyond simply proposing 
that proportionality might apply, but has illustrated how it might, in fact, be 
deployed.  With courts currently divided all over the tiers-of-scrutiny hierar-
chy about which traditional standard applies to anti-SOCE laws, Justice 
Breyer’s flexible approach merits a close look. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Sexual orientation change efforts involve a “combustible combination of 
political, religious, psychiatric, and cultural forces.”288  The Supreme Court 
now needs to douse one facet of this flammable concoction by definitively 
 
 285. Breyer, supra note 217, at 253 (explaining what Breyer believes to be the core values of pro-
tecting First Amendment speech); see also supra notes 231–33 and accompanying text (listing the 
three core values of protecting speech under the First Amendment). 
 286. See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 
964, 966 (1978) (contending that speech should be safeguarded not only “as a means to a collective 
good but because of the value of speech conduct to the individual”).  As more fully explained by 
Professor Edward J. Eberle: 
Intrinsically, free speech is valuable because it promotes and reflects human personality 
and is an essence of human dignity.  Autonomy to think, listen, and speak for oneself is 
essential to a free and self-determining human being.  Free speech theorists have captured 
aspects of this justification for expression as resting on a basis of individual self-fulfill-
ment, self-realization, or liberty. 
Edward J. Eberle, Cross Burning, Hate Speech, and Free Speech in America, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 
960–61 (2004) (footnotes omitted). 
 287. Baker, supra note 286, at 966 (“Speech is protected not as a means to a collective good but 
because of the value of speech conduct to the individual.”); cf. supra note 11 and accompanying text 
(listing some of the potential negative effects of SOCE, including depression, anxiety, and suicidal 
thoughts). 
 288. Calvert & Bunker, supra note 248, at 394. 
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resolving the standard of scrutiny that applies when conversion therapists 
bring free-speech challenges to anti-SOCE statutes.  Unfortunately, the Court 
twice dodged opportunities in 2019 to do precisely that by refusing to hear 
King and Pickup.289 
This Article illustrated the different approaches lower courts have em-
braced regarding scrutiny in cases attacking anti-SOCE statutes.290  It also 
demonstrated how the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Becerra exacerbated 
problems by condemning a nascent professional speech doctrine.291  That doc-
trine was favorably cited by the Third Circuit in King and the Ninth Circuit in 
Pickup to justify applying tests—intermediate scrutiny in King292 and rational 
basis review in Pickup293—less than strict scrutiny.  Furthermore, the Article 
revealed disagreement in early 2019 over scrutiny in the Hamilton and Vazzo 
cases involving anti-SOCE statutes.294  In brief, judges are flailing over scru-
tiny in the aftermath of Becerra.  And, unfortunately, this state of disarray 
arises just as more states are adopting anti-SOCE statutes.295 
Perhaps most significantly, the Article suggested that Justice Stephen 
Breyer’s proportionality methodology, rather than a traditional level of scru-
tiny, may provide a solution for resolving the scrutiny debate in anti-SOCE 
law cases, especially given the disagreement among lower courts over 
 
 289. See supra notes 186–87 (noting the Court’s refusal to grant a petition for writ of certiorari in 
both Pickup and King). 
 290. See supra text accompanying notes 43–46 (describing how federal judges in the same state 
believed different standards of scrutiny applied to interpretation of anti-SOCE statutes); see, e.g., Otto 
v. City of Boca Raton, 353 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1258 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (“The Court concludes that it is 
unclear what standard of review should apply to this case.  It seems likely that the ordinances are 
subject to more than rational basis review, but beyond the determination, it is unclear whether inter-
mediate or strict scrutiny should apply.”); Vazzo v. City of Tampa, No. 8:17-cv-2896-T-02AAS, 2019 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35935, at *19 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2019) (agreeing with the Court in Becerra that 
“traditional constitutional analyses, including strict-scrutiny analysis, applies to content-based regula-
tions on professional speech”). 
 291. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375 (2018) (“[N]either 
California nor the Ninth Circuit has identified a persuasive reason for treating professional speech as 
a unique category that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles.”). 
 292. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 234 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 293. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 294. See supra Part I (addressing how the courts in Otto and Vazzo resolved the scrutiny question).   
 295. See supra note 9. 
[Vol. 47: 1, 2019] Testing the First Amendment 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
44 
whether speech is even at issue.296  The Article also offered one possible sce-
nario for how a proportionality approach might unfold in an anti-SOCE case 
filed by a conversion therapist.297  That scenario, of course, is clearly not the 
only one a court might adopt; it was simply proposed here to illustrate what a 
Breyer-like approach might entail. 
The bottom line is that the Supreme Court urgently needs to clarify how 
Becerra affects scrutiny in anti-SOCE law cases.  In the process, it must iden-
tify the correct level of scrutiny in such disputes.  The occupational future of 
conversion therapists and, more importantly, the psychological wellbeing of 
minors, rest in the balance. 
 
 296. See supra notes 71–85 (explaining how the Ninth Circuit in Pickup concluded that SOCE was 
merely conduct and therefore California’s anti-SOCE statute was subject to mere rational basis re-
view). 
 297. See supra notes 283–84 and accompanying text (explaining how a Breyer-like approach might 
play out). 
